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Research Question: Why would Iran insist on pursuing its nuclear ambiguity
policy despite its status as a party to the NPT and international sanctions?
The study findings indicate that although there is no conclusive proof that Iran
has a weapons program, Iran could be pursuing a strategy of a nuclear ambiguity; the
possibility it may have a weapons program acts as a deterrent against potential
existential threats to its national security.
These findings were based on evidence gathered through interviews with various
experts, and conducting a comparison between the conventional weapons possessed
by Iran and those possessed by neighboring countries in light of the nature of the
existential threats that face Iran. Iran feels that it lives in a hostile environment in the
region, and faces collective threats from its adversaries which threaten its national
security. Hence, nuclear weapons, or the threat of, could balance nuclear threats that
cannot be dealt with through conventional weapons.

iii

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AEOI

: The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

AP

: The Additional Protocol

CIA

: The Central Intelligence Agency

GCC

: The Gulf Cooperation Council

HEU

: High Enriched Uranium

IAEA

: The International Atomic Energy Agency

IRGC

: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

LEU

: Low Enriched Uranium

NATO

: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT

: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NWFZ

: Nuclear weapons of Free Zone

TNRC

: The Tehran Nuclear Research Center

UNGA

: The United Nations General Assembly

UNSC

: The United Nations Security Council

WMD

: Weapons of Mass Destruction

FATF

: The Financial Action Task Force
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INTRODUCTION
The Iranian nuclear file is one of the most controversial issues on the
International scene. In the 1950s, Iran started to develop its nuclear program, while in
the 1970s USA expressed its concerns that the Iranian nuclear program might have a
military dimension, and the implications of this program will negatively affect the
nuclear non-proliferation efforts. The Iranian issue also will affect the stability and
USA influence in the region. The Iranian nuclear activities have generated significant
concern that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon despite the Iranian claims that its
1

program is limited to peaceful uses (K. Kerr, 2012).

The goal of this thesis is to investigate the reasons that Iran may have for
pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Although there is no conclusive proof of that
Iran is pursuing a weapons program, this project treats its pursuit as an assumption
based on concerns raised by the IAEA that Iran's nuclear program might have a
military dimension.
In 2007, there was a work plan between the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and Iran, as it’s a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), in order to clarify the unsettled questions regarding the Iranian nuclear
program. Most of these questions have been resolved except the remaining major
question, which causes concerns that the Iranian nuclear program might have a
2

military dimension.

The IAEA concerns were based on Iran's building of gas centrifuges for
enriching uranium, especially that the Article IV of the NPT gives the right to the

1

Kerr, P. K. (2012). Iran’s nuclear program: Status. Retrieved from Congressional Research Service
website: www.crs.gov
2
The Secretariat, (2007). Understandings of the Islamic republic of Iran and the IAEA on the modalities
of resolution of the outstanding issue, (INFCIRC/711). Retrieved from IAEA website:
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf.
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states parties to the treaty to develop nuclear programs for peaceful purposes. These
centrifuges can enrich both low enriched uranium (LEU) as well as high enriched
uranium (HEU), which is the major element of developing nuclear weapons and,
consequently, the nuclear proliferation.
Moreover, Iran received external assistance from China, Pakistan North
Korea, and Russia in order to construct its nuclear facilities. For instance, Russia
signed an $800 million contract with Iran in 1995 to build the Bushehr nuclear reactor
(The Arms Control Association, 1997).

3

Why would Iran insist on pursuing its nuclear ambiguity policy despite its
status as a party to the NPT and international sanctions? There are two major
perceptions in the literature that may encourage Iran to develop its nuclear weapon
namely the deterrence against potential threats, and the goals of the Islamic
revolution. I will discuss both arguments to assess which one is more persuasive.
First, Iran claims that it faces threats from its neighboring countries such as
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the existence of USA forces in the Middle East. These
threats may be a possible motivation to possess nuclear weapons. Hence, Iran may
want to possess a nuclear weapon, as a deterrent weapon in order to meet these
threats; especially that most of these states, excluding USA and probably its ally
Israel, have only conventional weapons. In addition, this project examines the Iranian
claims which assume that Iran faces external threats from its adversaries in the region.

3

(1997). Russian-Iran ties remain issue at gore-Chernomyrdin meeting. Retrieved from Arms Control
Association website: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_09/gcc2sept.
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It also examines Iran’s aspirations to own nuclear capabilities in order to overcome
these threats, something that cannot be done with conventional weapons, by
discussing Iran's relations with each state, the conventional capabilities of each state,
and whether or not these states pose an existential threat to Iran.
Second, Iran may have a grand strategy which aims at expanding its goals in
the region, and recreating the Persian Empire. Continuing the Islamic revolution of
1979 has been the main Iranian goal for decades. Tehran believes that this ideology
requires a powerful weapon such as the nuclear bomb in order to reach its target
without facing obstacles. The nuclear weapon would constitute the first step in
accomplishing such expansionist goals. The nuclear weapon, as a powerful tool,
would enable Iran to balance the power in the Middle East, and reduce the influence
of some states in the region such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain as well as USA presence,
which would not be achieved with the conventional weapons.
The study findings indicate that Iran wants to possess a nuclear weapon as a
deterrent against existential threats, especially the threat posed by the only nuclear
state in the Middle East; Israel, as well as the threat of the U.S potential military
action. Iran cannot deter these threats with conventional weapons, of course. The
findings also refute the perception that Iran wants to possess a nuclear weapon as a
means to achieve its strategic intention of recreating the Persian Empire in the Gulf;
this perception is not supported by the evidence collected.

3

The Iranian Nuclear Puzzle
Iran claims that it is developing its nuclear program for peaceful purposes
using its right according to the Article IV of the NPT, denial. However, there is
significant concern that it is actually seeking nuclear weapons. Iran's action is
puzzling because it is a party state to the NPT, which places Iran under international
sanctions and condemnation. This part will put this puzzle within the context of the
history of Iran’s nuclear program and its status as a member state in the NPT.
In 1968, Iran signed the NPT with the commitment not to seek to acquire a
nuclear weapon; however, many countries including the United States as well as the
IAEA have expressed their concerns that Iran violated the NPT despite its status in the
NPT. Iran signed the NPT as a long-term strategy to develop its nuclear capabilities,
and access the nuclear threshold. Iran did not follow the policy of India, Pakistan and
Israel because it did not have a strong ally to depend on, especially a nuclear state.
Hence, Iran preferred to develop is nuclear program under the umbrella of the NPT.
This explains why Iran signed the NPT, yet seemingly it seeks a nuclear weapon.
Iran's endeavor to possess nuclear weapons has entailed harmful economic
sanctions by the United States, Europe, which strongly affected the Iranian economy.
However, Iran insists on pursuing its policy of nuclear ambiguity despite all sanctions
and pressures. Iran is acting suspiciously by following the policy of nuclear ambiguity
and building underground nuclear facilities until declaring its withdrawal from the
NPT after getting the nuclear weapon. Iran follows this policy because it feels that it
lives in a hostile environment; accordingly, if Iran declares its withdrawal from the
NPT, and makes announcements regarding its nuclear activities, it would face a preemptive military action against its nuclear facilities. Working under the umbrella of
4

the NPT provides Iran with the strategic ambiguity regarding the extent of progress of
the program until it reaches the nuclear threshold. In addition, as an NPT member
state, Iran's ambiguity policy protects the country from declaring its activities within
the NPT obligations. The military surveillance and the existential threats make Iran
insists on following the nuclear ambiguity policy in order to avoid a military attack if
it declares its real nuclear capabilities.
Until now, Iran has not changed its behavior either to announce that it does not
possess a nuclear weapon, or to declare its withdrawal from the NPT. Iran knows that
the threats that face it are not from the Gulf States because it has enough conventional
capabilities to deter the conventional threats of these states. Iran believes that the real
threats come from the West and its ally Israel. However, Iran follows the classical
deterrence because it does not have enough conventional capabilities to challenge the
United States. That is why Iran might seek nuclear weapons through its program in
order to make the cost of any potential military action against it too high.
It is almost impossible to convince Iran to dissuade its nuclear program which
costs billions of dollars to be achieved. Iran will continue developing its nuclear
policy, especially the full fuel cycle technology, as long as the military presence is
continuing behind its borders. No offer has yet been sufficient to dissuade Iran from
continuing its nuclear policy of ambiguity, not even USA offer to lift the sanctions on
some banks. Thus, Iran will keep the ambiguity as it neither intends to withdraw from
the NPT nor proves that it is not developing a nuclear weapon.

5

Iran and the Article IV of the NPT
The Article IV of the NPT emphasizes the inherent right of all parties to the
Treaty to conduct research and produce nuclear energy for peaceful uses in
accordance with both Article I and II of the NPT. In addition, all Parties to the NPT
have the right to exchange materials or scientific information for the peaceful
purposes on nuclear energy. The cooperation between parties also includes providing
further development to the peaceful uses on nuclear energy from states or
international organizations, especially for the non-nuclear weapons states and the
developing countries.4
In this regard, the Iranian undeclared nuclear activities including the uranium
enrichment have raised questions regarding Iran's commitment to its obligations, as a
party, toward the NPT. Greater concerns came from the nuclear fuel cycle which
includes installations for the uranium enrichment process. This process could produce
high-enriched uranium for nuclear weapon. The NPT is framing legal regulations to
be followed by the parties to the treaty in order to achieve the main purpose which is
preventing the nuclear arms race.
New concerns have been expressed when the IAEA has issued a report in 2003
declares that Iran was working secretly on developing nuclear weapons. Iran's failure
to meet its obligations to the NPT, and report its facilities such as building
underground reactors for uranium enrichment and constructing power plants for heavy
water.

4

(1970). Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (INFCIRC/140). London, Moscow and
Washington: International Atomic Energy Agency.
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In other words, the Article IV of the NPT gives the right to all parties to cooperate
and exchange the nuclear technology with the nuclear states for the peaceful purposes.
However, Iran follows the nuclear ambiguity regarding its nuclear activities which
entails the IAEA reports and the UNSC resolutions, followed by strict economic
sanctions.
The hostility between Iran and the U.S., which is evident in the mutual assertive
rhetoric between the two states, encourages Iran to follow the policy of nuclear
ambiguity regarding is activities despite what the Article IV provides. This policy is
due the Iranian feeling of being surrounded with threats, especially from the U.S
military presence in the region. This feeling forced Iran to mask its nuclear activities
in order to deter its adversaries.
In addition, Iran, as a party to the NPT, has the right to develop its nuclear program
for peaceful purposes according to Article IV. However, although the considerable
amount of reports, sanctions and resolutions on Iran from the IAEA and the UNSC,
Iran is always negotiating with the UN and the nuclear states to reduce the sanctions
on Iran. How does a state have the right to develop its nuclear program according to
the provisions of the NPT negotiate on its right asking for reducing the sanctions
imposed on it? Hence, if Iran is really working under Article IV, it would refuse
negotiating on its right.
All in all, the reliance on the policy of nuclear ambiguity is the only way for Iran to
get the nuclear threshold and avoid being attacked in the same time.

7

Evidence of an Iranian Intent to Pursue a Nuclear Weapon
Iran’s official position claims that its nuclear program is only for peaceful
purposes using its inherent right according to the Article IV of the NPT. Ramin
Mehmanparast, a spokesman for Iran’s foreign ministry, claimed that Iran does not
seek nuclear weapons, referring to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's Fatwa that bans nuclear
weapons. Tehran is always trying to reduce USA suspicions by stating such Fatwa as
a tool to decrease sanctions. Mehmanparast mentioned that there is a culture gap
between Iran and USA, saying that the West does not realize the importance of Fatwa
5

(Eisenstadt & Khalaji, 2011). Iran also claims that its nuclear program is for peaceful
uses as a strategy to gain the support of the other members of the Non-Aligned
Movement.
Nonetheless, there is a widely held belief that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. For
instance, there is no doubt among the intelligence bodies of the United States, Europe
and Israel that Iran is enriching uranium, and working on required infrastructure to
become a nuclear state. In a Senate session in 2012, the chief of intelligence James
Clapper claimed that Iran is certainly in its path, but it has not yet taken the decision
to make a nuclear weapon. American and European analysts believe that Iran has
passed the hardest step into building a nuclear weapon. The IAEA's inspectors have
issued reports clarifying that Iran started to enrich uranium in an underground
installation (Risen & Mazzetti, 2012).

6

5

Eisenstadt, M., &Khalaji, M. (2011). Nuclear fatwa: Religion and politics in Iran’s proliferation
strategy. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
6
Risen, J., &Mazzetti, M. (2012, February 24).USA. Agencies see no move by Iran to build a bomb. The
New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/world/middleeast/usagencies-see-no-move-by-iran-to-build-a-bomb.html?_r=3&.
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Officials said that Iran seeks increasing its influence in the region by following
the strategy of nuclear ambiguity. Iran is acting suspiciously to show its power
regarding its nuclear aspirations. They believe that Iran follows the same policy of
India and Pakistan as they were secretly working on the nuclear weapons until they
7

got the nuclear bomb (Risen & Mazzetti, 2012). The UK Minister of Foreign Affairs
claimed that Iran has secretly tested missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, in
defiance to the United Nations resolution. He added that Iran is enriching more
uranium than the required for peaceful energy. USA also has concerns that Iran has
long-range missiles after the Iranian declaration that Iran has successfully tested
missiles during military maneuvers (CNN, 27, 9, 2011).

8

Another act of suspicion done by Iran was when the IAEA received a report
confirming that there was an underground installation on a military facility, while Iran
denied that this facility contains any nuclear materials. Iran also claimed that there is
no goal to make nuclear weapon, which does not explain why they work on a civil
program underground (CNN, 2009).

9

.
7

Ibid.
Iran testing missiles that could carry nuclear weapon, UK's Hague says. (2011, Jan 29).
CNN.Retrieved from
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/06/29/iran.missiles.tests/index.html.
9
Iran nuclear official says IAEA can inspect new plant. (2009, Sep 27). CNN. Retrieved from
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/09/26/iran.nuclear/.
8

9

In addition, an Iranian opposition member claimed that there is a secret
underground nuclear enrichment facility, while USA nuclear experts said that they
were not convinced. The speaker of the National Council of Resistance, Alireza
Jafarzadeh, said that he got this information from the Mujahedeen Organization of
10

Iran that discovered Natanz site in 2002. (Ure, 2010).

The IAEA has issued reports on Iran regarding its non-compliance with the
agency and, consequently, with the NPT. Iran challenges the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) by pursuing its program for uranium enrichment and heavy water
activities. The IAEA is spending efforts to overcome the concerns regarding the
potential military dimension of the Iranian nuclear program, but Iran is not
cooperating fully with the Agency (Carlson, 2011).

11

Iran has failed to declare its activities and safeguards agreement with the
agency since 1980s. These activities include the nuclear experiments. In 2004, the
IAEA issued a report on Iran clarifying the entire Iranian program with the NPT
12

violations. (Shire & Albright, 2006).

10

Ure, L. (2010, Sep 9). Iranian secret nuclear site disclosed, opposition group claims. CNN. Retrieved
from http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/09/09/iran.nuclear.site/index.html.
11
Carlson, J. (2011). Iran nuclear issue – considerations for a negotiated outcome. Washington, DC:
Institute for Science and International Security.
12
Shire, J., & Albright, D. (2006). Iran’s npt violations – numerous and possibly on-going? The Institute
for Science and International Security.

10

The IAEA reports stated that Iran failed to declare many activities. First, Iran
failed to declare that it had imported natural uranium from China in 1991, and had
acknowledged this deal in 2003. Second, Iran did not inform the IAEA that it used the
imported uranium in the uranium conversion processes and produced uranium. Third,
Iran failed to declare that it had used imported UF6 to test centrifuges at Kalaye
13

Electric Company (IAEA, 2004).

Fourth, Iran failed to report the existence of

uranium enrichment installation at Kalaye Company and laser plants at Tehran
Research Center. Fifth, Iran failed to declare the importation of 50 kg of natural
uranium in 1993, and made experiments at Tehran Research Center. Sixth, Iran did
not declare that it had conducted plutonium Experiments, and failed to declare the
transfer of waste resulting from these activities. Iran acknowledged all these breaches
in 2003 (IAEA, 2003).

14

There is a fear that Iran would declare its withdrawal from the NPT after
completing the nuclear fuel cycle under cover of civil program, just like what North
Korea did. Given the Iranian unwillingness to increase cooperation with the IAEA,
the refusal of enriching uranium in Russia, and the Iranian threats that it will
withdraw from the NPT, the actual withdrawal cannot be excluded in the future
(Kubbig, 2006).

15

13

Board of Governors, (2004). Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic
republic of Iran (GOV/2004/83). Retrieved from International Atomic Energy Agency website:
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-83.pdf.
14
Board of Governors, (2003). Implementation of the NPT Safeguards agreement in the Islamic
republic of Iran (GOV/2003/75). Retrieved from International Atomic Energy Agency website:
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf.
15
Kubbig, B. W. (2006). Policy Department External Policies, Iran and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Frankfurt: European Parliament.
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The Impact of Sanctions on Iran
U.N. Secretary-General mentioned that the Iranian citizens were negatively
affected by the sanctions which resulted in rising inflation, rising unemployment and
shortage in lifesaving medicines. He stated that Iran's ‘Rial’ has lost about 40 % of its
value against the American Dollar. It is worth mentioning that the UNSC has imposed
rounds of sanctions to dissuade Iran from continuing its nuclear program, while Iran
insists that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes (Fox News, 5, October,
2012).

16

The increase in food prices in Iran has been followed by rising public

discontent. Meanwhile, the Iranian former President Ahmadinejad condemned the
West of launching hidden war that negatively affected the Iranian ability to export oil.
Ahmadinejad added that there are obstacles in transferring money and selling oil
despite his previous statements that Iran will resist the imposed sanction: "we have oil
and the world needs it". The IAEA evaluations claimed that the Iranian oil exports
17

had been reduced to one million barrels instead of three millions (Blomfield, 2012).

The West insists on punishing Iran for its nuclear aspirations, but it is the
Iranian residents who are seriously affected by each round of sanctions. An Iranian
citizen said that he is working so hard, but he cannot save enough money. He added
that the latest round of sanctions that were imposed by the United States on the

16

Un chief ban says sanctions are hurting Iranians as inflation takes its toll. (2012). Fox News.
Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/10/05/un-chief-ban-says-sanctions-arehurting-iranians-as-inflation-takes-its-toll/.
17
Blomfield, A. (2012). Mahmoud Ahmadinejad concedes Iran sanctions hurting economy. The
Telegraph, Retrieved from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9523230/Mahmoud-Ahmadinejadconcedes-Iran-sanctions-hurting-economy.html.

12

Central Bank of Iran caused tremendous inflation; the food prices rose by up to 50
percent (Bozorgmehr & Basu, 2012).

18

Tehran has testified the first public outcry against the collapse of the Iranian currency
and the economic crises. Economic analysts and politicians stated that these protests
reflect the great impact of the severe USA economic sanctions imposed on Iran due to
its nuclear policy. Iran faces great obstacles in exporting oil, and re-increasing the
value of the Iranian Rial against foreign currencies because Iran is economically
isolated from the global banking system. That is why the Iranian government has
19

failed to control the increasing economic crisis (Erdbrink& Gladstone, 2012).
Other explanations for the Iranian aspirations

There are other explanations for the Iranian aspirations. It has been argued that
politics in Iran depends mainly on the religion principals. These principals play a
fundamental role in determining the state’s approach to a lot of issues. In this regard,
during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran's military tried to enhance the human and logistic
support in the front lines. Nonetheless, calling more soldiers would pose undesirable
reaction from the Iranian people unless there is a high morale among the forces.
Hence, the Iranian leaders used the Islamic Fiqh (religious law) by employing some
clergies and rhetoric in order to legitimize the war and encourage mobilization
20

(Eisenstadt & Khalaji, 2011).

18

Bozorgmehr, S., & Basu, M. (2012). Sanctions take toll on ordinary Iranians. Retrieved from
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/23/world/meast/iran-sanctions-effects.
19
Erdbrink, T., & Gladstone, R. (2012). Violence and protest in Iran as currency drops in value. The
New York Times, Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/world/middleeast/clashesreported-in-tehran-as-riot-police-target-money-changers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
20
Eisenstadt, M., &Khalaji, M. (2011). Nuclear fatwa: Religion and politics in Iran’s proliferation
strategy. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
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The religious beliefs, doctrines and values influence the political decision making
inside Iran. This religious doctrine is likely to critically affect the decisions regarding
Iran's nuclear program.
Relations between Iran and Bahrain were determined by the Iranian attempts
to export the Islamic revolution to the Gulf countries, especially in 1980s and 1990s.
Bahrain claims that Iran interferes in its internal affairs, while Iran condemns the
Bahraini regime for oppressing Bahrain's Shiite (followers of the Iranian Islamic
sect). The former Iranian parliament member Ali Akbar Nouri claimed that Bahrain
was an Iranian governorate and had a delegate in the parliament which led to more
tensions in their relations, and suspended the negotiations regarding the energy sector
21

(Fulton & Wellman, 2011).

In addition, there is an ideological conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia due
to the Saudi accusations to Iran that it tries to influence the Shiite people who live in
the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia and create its leverage in the Gulf. Moreover,
the ministers of the Arab states condemned Iran, during the Arab Foreign Ministers
Meeting in 2001, due to its interference in their internal affairs, especially after the
call of the Iranian President Ahmadinejad for Saudi Arabia to withdraw its military
22

forces from Bahrain (Teitelbaum, 2011).

21

Fulton, W., & Wellman, A. F. Foreign Relations, Middle East. (2011). Bahrain-Iran foreign relations.
Retrieved from Iran Tracker website: http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/bahrain-iranforeign-relations.
22
Teitelbaum, J. (2011). Saudi Arabia, Iran and America in the wake of the Arab spring, The BeginSadat Center for Strategic Studies.
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However, the above explanations are far from convincing. First, they sound like
normal bickering between Sunni and Shiite, just like any conflict between the two
different communities. These conflicts are amplified by the media as a means of
23

pressure on Iran (Zahran, personal interview, 8 April, 2013).

Second, the Shiite sect has its radical groups which pose no more than 1 % of
the population; this percentage cannot represent Shiite domination or justify Iran's
position. However, the moderate Shiite does not seek the domination of the region or
spread their Shiite credo (Abushady, personal interview, 1 April, 2013).

24

Third, the Iranian nuclear ambition is related to its history, as a former empire,
more than the spread of the Shiite doctrine (Anonymous source, personal interview,
25

18 April, 2013).

23

Zahran, M. (2013, April 08). Interview by Tamer. S Mahboub, “Understanding the Iranian
motivations for possessing nuclear capabilities”.
24
Abu-Shadi, Y. (2013, April 01). Interview by Tamer. S Mahboub.” Understanding the Iranian
motivations for possessing nuclear capabilities”.
25Anonymous. (2013, April 18). Interview by Tamer. S Mahboub . Understanding the Iranian
motivations for possessing nuclear capabilities.
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Argument
Iran believes that it lives in a hostile environment and therefore must follow a
strategy of nuclear ambiguity. This strategy means that they can work under the
umbrella of the NPT, avoid the announcement of their nuclear activities and get
protection against the possible hostile reaction. This policy provides Iran with the
ambiguity of the progress in its nuclear program until it produces the nuclear weapon.
Moreover, this policy protects Iran from more pressures because it is a member in the
NPT and has obligations to announce its nuclear activities. The military surveillance
encourages Iran to follow this policy to avoid exposure to any potential military
action.
Since Iran has enough conventional capabilities to deter the conventional
threats of the Gulf States, Iran knows that the threats it faces are not from these states;
the real threats come from the West and its ally Israel. As Iran’s conventional weapon
capabilities are insufficient to challenge or defend itself against the United States, Iran
is possibly trying to develop nuclear weapons through its program in order to make
the cost of any potential military action against it too high for USA to risk. There are
no possible allies to support Iran in case of exposure to military action except Syria,
which is now unable to offer Iran any aid due to its ongoing civil war. These threats
make it unlikely that Iran will abandon or dismantle its nuclear program.
The policy of nuclear ambiguity enables Iran to hide its nuclear activities and,
consequently, avoid being exposed to more threats. Keeping its membership in the
NPT helps Iran avoid the increasing international pressures until it produces the
nuclear bomb.
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Evidence that Iran is Pursuing Nuclear Ambiguity
The hypothesis that "Iran is pursuing a strategy of nuclear ambiguity" will be
tested through strategic assessment of the situation in the Gulf. The assessment will
include the historical accumulation of events that led to USA-Iranian hostility such as
the 1953 coup in Iran, Iran hostage crisis and Carter's mission, USA support of Iraq
against Iran, USA rhetoric support of Israel against Iran, the UN resolutions against
Iran driven by USA and sanctions driven by USA through IAEA and NPT.
In addition, this research will discuss the further threats coming from the
possible support from NATO to launch military action against Iran, USA support of
the Gulf States against Iran and USA military presence in the Gulf, which poses
threats to the national security of Iran.
This project will also compare the conventional weapons capabilities of Iran
and other states in the region to assess whether Iran actually needs a nuclear weapon
to protect its national security against existential threats.
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CHAPTER I: REVIEW OF LITERATURE
In this literature review the Iranian nuclear aspirations, will be assessed
through the presentation of three important factors:
I-

Different views regarding the motivations of states to possess nuclear
weapons.

II-

Approaches related to the nuclear deterrence theory.

III-

How states may be prevented from possessing nuclear weapons.
Consequently, the Iranian nuclear policy will be discussed; the reasons
why Iran insists on continuing its nuclear ambiguity policy, despite its
status as a party to the NPT, will be investigated as well.

Motivations for Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon
There are two main explanations of why states seek nuclear weapons: These
are the military security and the protection of sovereignty. The military security is the
crucial factor for the states who are not allied to one of the nuclear states, or who do
not have satisfactory conventional capabilities to guarantee their military security and
achieve deterrence against a rival nuclear state, such as Iran for instance. (Epstein,
1977).
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Some scholars believe that such strategies should be adopted by a given

government to protect its national security against any potential threats (Maoz,
2003).
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The domestic politics in both India and Pakistan pose difficulty for them to
abandon their nuclear weapons. However, on the international level, both states
believe that their policy of strengthening the nuclear capabilities is essential for
achieving the nuclear deterrence which provides a protection for their security. Each
state follows this policy to deter the other rival or to prevent it from taking action
(Hagerty, 1993).

28

The political prestige, powerful economy, and independent status are the
prevailing motivations for the states allied to one of the nuclear superpower countries
(Epstein, 1977).
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The tendency of destruction could be hidden behind the desire of

owning nuclear weapons and, consequently, launching nuclear wars. Many studies
revealed that war is not economically useful, even in the case of victory, as the most
common reason for war and the continuing development of military capabilities is the
30

greed and the self-interest (Kull, 1983).

However, I don't think that this applies to Iran because if Iran has the tendency of
destruction or self-interest, it will be fighting in more than one front as it has many
adversaries in the region. Another concept on seeking nuclear weapons focuses on the
role of domestic politicians who affect the decision-making to develop nuclear
weapons. A third concept sees that nuclear weapons possession reflects the identity of
31

the state, and serves its symbolic functions (Sagan, 1997).
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Neorealist theories of nuclear arms racing argue that countries in conflict
prone regional systems seek self-reliance in order to protect their sovereignty and
national security. If the country has a rival with a nuclear weapon, the tendency is for
32

balancing (Sagan, 1997).

Israel has an interest to prevent Iran from acquiring a

nuclear weapon because the current single nuclear state in the Middle East poses
unstable security circumstances in the region. Israel is a unique case in this regard;
accordingly, this single power will be removed if Iran becomes a nuclear state (Waltz,
2012).
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States seek nuclear weapons, and bear the international censure, even if they

will remain a mini-nuclear arsenal, in order to pursue nuclear deterrence. For instance,
the Indian-Pakistani rivalry has become more stable after conducting nuclear tests,
and proving that they have nuclear capabilities, which led to a stable nuclear
deterrence (Carolyn C. James, 2000).
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There are both external and internal reasons for the arms race. Externally, the arms
race is a reaction done by the states in order to meet the threats coming from the
rival's military buildup. Internally, states tend to meet their military requirements
through creating powerful political institutions in order to serve and pursue their
interests. These institutions help the state to achieve its international aims including
the enforcement of military technology, as the technological advancement poses an
35

impetus into the arms race (Glaser, 2000).

In this regard, Iran started to develop its

nuclear technology with creating strong governments over the years, controlled by the
Iran's Revolutionary Guards, to support its policy.
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The lack of nuclear or conventional security poses a motivation for acquiring a
nuclear weapon to launch conflicts or to achieve balance of power with adversaries.
States may face internal turmoil by developing nuclear program as a manner to divert
public opinion, as both India and Pakistan did during the development of their nuclear
programs (Jo & Gartzke, 2007).
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States see that nuclear weapons have unique

destructive characteristics that changed the nature of warfare rather than depending on
conventional capabilities. These characteristics motivate the states to own a nuclear
37

weapon in order to raise the costs of any potential threats. (Horowitz, 2009).
Nuclear Deterrence Theory

Many states use nuclear deterrence as a means to protect their national security
and keep their sovereignty. The deterrence theory is a kind of coercion used by states
in order to deter their adversaries from taking military action by convincing them that
the cost of taking action would be higher than a possible gain. If a country prevents its
adversary from attacking it through waving that the costs will be serious, the country
will be diminishing potential risks. This strategy does not mean that the state has a
strong defensive mechanism. The state cannot face the threats; however, it succeeded
38

in forcing its adversary not to attack it (Powell, 1990).

The indications concerning the efficiency of nuclear weapons as a deterrent
are different. Some analysts believe that clashes between nuclear and non-nuclear
states are mostly in favor of the non-nuclear states. Others think that acquiring a
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nuclear weapon does not give an advantage in confrontations with non-nuclear states
39

indicating that the classical theory of nuclear deterrence is defective (Geller, 1990).

Kenneth Waltz argues that there are three basic elements to achieve a stable
and rational nuclear deterrence. First, avoid launching a preventive war, throughout
the transitional phase, when one state is nuclear-capable and the other state is building
a nuclear capability. Second, two rival states must develop their ability to cause
unacceptable destruction, and improve the efficiency of the second strike in order to
retaliate in case of vulnerability to attack. Third, the nuclear weapons must not be
40

liable to unofficial use (Sagan, 1994).

The nuclear deterrence strategy has a specific purpose; it prevents the state's
adversary from doing a harmful action using the nuclear weapon, and threatens of
nuclear retaliation. The deterrence has its components such as sufficient military tools
to deter the adversary in specific ways and avoid thinking to start the attack.
Deterrence is effective when a state has the political will and credibility to be able to
41

deter its adversaries (Charles W. Durr, 2002). The strategy of deterrence depends on
the use of direct or indirect threats to force the other party to keep the status quo.
The 'immediate deterrence' and the 'general deterrence' are the two major types. The
immediate exists between rival states when one party intends to attack, while the other
is increasing the threats of retaliation to deter the first party. The general deterrence
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concerns rival states which keep their forces to organize their ties (Quackenbush,
2010).

42

In the 1990s, Israel, for example, faced potential attack from Iraq; hence, the Israeli
decision makers launched a number of explicit threats to retaliate. These threats were
a defensive mechanism, or recognition of the failure of Israel to achieve nuclear
deterrence, to reduce the significance of the military capabilities of Iraq. Accordingly,
many Israeli officials think that Iran did not attack Israel using chemical weapons due
43

to the fear of the Israeli nuclear retaliation (Maoz, 2003).

States exposed to a potential nuclear attack must follow a strategy of nuclear
deterrence. Dealing with nuclear weapons entails the dependence on deterrence policy
which is better than alternative policies such as coercion. For instance, USA President
Obama said that the danger of nuclear war has been reduced, while the threat of
nuclear attack has grown, indicating that the deterrence is important if we seek a
reduction of this danger (Long & Ellsberg, 2012).
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The nuclear deterrence is keeping

the nuclear arsenals because it is rarely to come under attack. The spread of confusion
regarding the nuclear deterrence comes from the idea that the deterrence does not
have credibility unless the use of nuclear weapons is considered (Long & Ellsberg,
2012).
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Why might states be prevented from possessing nuclear weapons?
Some states such as Belarus and Ukraine have been persuaded to join the
46

NPT, as non-nuclear states, after the Soviet Union’s collapse (Kimball, 2013). The
idea of nuclear weapons free zones has emerged as a result of the states that have
capacity to develop nuclear weapons and, consequently led to the arms race (UN
47

Secretary-General Report, 1991). This concept shows that if states do not have the
capacity, they will not be enabled to possess nuclear weapons.
Some states signed the NPT to achieve a long-term peace which reflects on
their national security, and accomplishes the principle of the nuclear nonproliferation. Other states would sign the NPT for strategic purposes, especially if
they have nuclear programs for peaceful purposes that can be potentially developed.
Each state member in the NPT has different purpose to join it; this purpose is either
political or otherwise, but there is no specific reason that encourages the state to work
48

on its nuclear program (Fahmy 2006). Some scholars argue that states, such as Iran,
prefer to adopt offensive doctrine, especially if they do not have strong allies (Mayer,
2004).
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The Iranian president Ahmadinejad threatened to wipe Israel from the map, while, in
exchange, Netanyahu claimed that Iran is a new model of Nazi Germany. These
statements are a defensive mechanism or a deterrent tool to deter and prevent each
other from posing potential threat, especially that there are suspicions that both states
50

have nuclear capabilities. (Karpin, 2009).

USA believes that Iran must be prevented from possessing a nuclear weapon
because it is mainly targeting USA, threatening its ally Israel, and supporting
international terrorism. This belief encourages USA to impose sanctions on Iran due
to its nuclear activities, while Iran is developing its nuclear program, and using the
nuclear deterrence in order to avoid potential military attack from USA (Barzashka &
Oelrich, 2012).
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Before the Gulf War, and after the Iraqi missiles threat to Israel, Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Shamir claimed that Israel has very strong military capabilities. This
policy was to achieve the deterrence, compensate the Israeli small size and to respond
to the potential threats in the region until it gets a deterrent weapon such as the
52

nuclear weapon to be able to deter its rivals. (Carlson, Hooton & Page, 2013).
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The Iranian Nuclear Policy
Nobody has compelling evidence that Iran owns a nuclear weapon, while Iran
may be developing the nuclear weapon. Iran is still continuing its policy of nuclear
ambiguity to prevent its adversaries from posing threats (Barzashka & Oelrich,
2012).
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Iran depends on the nuclear ambiguity in its strategy until gets the nuclear

weapon. Iran adopts the nuclear ambiguity through denying any interest in obtaining a
nuclear weapon, while working, as much as possible, on developing its capabilities.
54

(IAEA, 1970).

This policy explains why Iran insists on continuing its nuclear policy despite
its accretion to the NPT. The nuclear ambiguity policy of Iran comes from its feeling
of vulnerability. Iran might aim to collect all needed components to create the nuclear
weapon which helps Iran to be a nuclear state once it faces an imminent attack from
55

USA or Israel (de Bellaigue, 2005). Iran seeks the know-how technology. It believes
that no state should be banned from acquiring the nuclear technology. It has been
argued that Iran signed the NPT to get access to such technology.
Some Iranian supporters think that Iran should declare its withdrawal from the
NPT even if it has to pay the costs of sanctions (Kemp, Eisenstadt, Farhi & Hadian,
2004).
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Regarding the IAEA reports and USA sanctions, Iran depends on
procrastination and deflects attention from its program. This ambiguity is to achieve
the nuclear hedging and, consequently, reach the nuclear threshold (Mayer, P.42,
2004).
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An official in the State Department stated that "The Iranians don't necessarily

have to have a successful nuclear program ... they merely have to convince USA,
others, and their neighbors that they do" (de Bellaigue, P.19, 2005).
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Although the

IAEA reports did not prove that Iran owns a nuclear weapon, IAEA showed how its
reports raised concerns regarding the Iranian activities and the strategies Iran would
follow in future such as cheating and retreating, posturing and blustering or waiting
and moving forward. The Iranian ambiguity policy in the past showes how much it is
cautious and does not provide conclusive evidence or clear effort regarding its
program (Cordesman& Al-Rodhan, 2006).
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Iran believes this policy is due to its perception of vulnerability to threats as
60

well as the international pressure imposed on the state (Milani, 2009).

Iran follows

the strategy of ambiguity as a means to magnify its political intentions. This policy
could remain for years until Iran intends to declare its possession to the nuclear
weapon. The Iranian nuclear ambiguity poses a great challenge to the states concerned
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by the Iranian nuclear issue (Barzashka&Oelrich, 2012).
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CHAPTER II:

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this project, the research methodology depends on the qualitative analysis
based on data collection in order to examine the Iranian motivations for possessing
nuclear capabilities. These data are used in an attempt to answer these questions:
1. Is Iran developing a nuclear weapon?
2. Does Iran have a real expansionist ideology that would not be achieved without
nuclear weapons?
3. Are there existential threats facing Iran and, is it forced to follow the policy of
nuclear ambiguity, since it is not as conventionally powerful as its adversaries?

Methods utilized in the study
First: Interviews have been conducted with professors, diplomats, scholars,
nuclear technicians and analysts in different fields such as international security,
political science, or nuclear energy in order to determine whether or not Iran is
seeking a nuclear weapon, the real motivation of Iran to possess nuclear capabilities,
the existential threats Iran is facing, and whether Iran has conventional capabilities
strong enough to protect its national security. These interviews helped to assess which
one of the two explanations is more plausible, and, consequently answer the main
research question of the study, which is: "Why does Iran insist on pursuing its nuclear
program despite its status as NPT signatory and international sanctions?"
Second: Some events surrounding Iran have been analyzed in order to identify
patterns of behaviors threatening Iran. These analyses are to assess whether Iran is
facing existential threats that would harm its national security. These threats include
the existence of foreign armed forces surrounding Iran, which poses security threats to
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its national security. The nature of relation between Iran and its neighboring countries,
and the allies of these countries, has also been analyzed in order to assess whether
Iran does really live in a hostile environment, and consequently, seeks nuclear
weapons. These analyses also assess the international sanctions and resolutions
against Iran in order to dissuade it from pursuing its nuclear activities.
Third: A chart that compares Iran and other Middle East countries, that may
pose threats to Iran on the level of conventional weapons, has been provided. This
comparison includes also the conventional capabilities of Iran's allies in the region.
The purpose of this comparison is to assess the conventional capabilities of Iran and
whether these capabilities are powerful enough to protect the Iranian national security.
This chart also assesses the conventional capabilities of Iran's allies to determine
whether these states can support Iran in protecting its sovereignty. The main purpose
of this chart is to assess the Iranian needs of a nuclear weapon to protect its national
security, and whether its conventional weapons are not capable of deterring external
threats.

Rationale for Choice of a Method
First: In addition to sources and pieces of evidence surveyed, personal
interviews have been conducted with experts from different fields and backgrounds in
order to assess whether Iran is arming and to identify the Iranian nuclear motivations.
These specific experts have been selected because they have wide experience
regarding the Iranian nuclear file from different perspectives. Their opinions helped to
assess the real nuclear intentions of Iran and whether it is actually developing a
nuclear weapon and the reasons behind the Iranian insistence of pursuing its nuclear
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program despite the international sanctions and its status as a signatory state to the
NPT.
Second: The reason why events surrounding Iran are brought to light here is to
understand how these events could affect the Iranian strategic intentions regarding its
nuclear program. These events determine the expected behavior from Iran in the
future and whether or not it will stop its nuclear program and how the international
community will deal with this dilemma if it continues. The relationship between Iran
and the other countries in the Middle East, or between Iran and the states that have
interests in the region, will determine whether or not Iran seeks nuclear weapons.
Iran's attitude of indifference towards the international sanctions and resolutions
explains its insistence on developing nuclear program.
Third: The conventional weapon chart is a means to assess whether Iran needs
to possess a nuclear weapon to protect the security of its territories. This becomes
clear after knowing the conventional capabilities of the other countries of the region
that could pose threats to Iran, assessing whether these states have conventional
capabilities stronger than Iran and, consequently, Iran seeks a nuclear weapon to
overcome these threats. This chart also shows capabilities of the Iranian allies and
whether they can help Iran in case of exposure to external threats. Hence, the
conventional weapon chart shows the extent of Iran's needs for a nuclear weapon.
What procedures did I use for each?
This is a description of how methods have been used. Six personal interviews
have been conducted with experts in different fields such as political science and
nuclear energy as well as diplomats that have participated in negotiations regarding
the Iranian nuclear issue. These interviews have been conducted in person and via
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email. About the events that would pose threats to Iran, I have relied on documentary
evidence regarding the presence of USA armed forces in the Gulf and the historical
events that posed animosity between USA and Iran. There has been focus also on the
IAEA reports and the UNSC resolutions on Iran as well as the economic sanctions
and embargo. Concerning the conventional weapons chart, the information regarding
the conventional capabilities has been obtained from the annual 'Military Balance
Report for Middle East and North Africa' issued by the 'International Institute for
Strategic Studies'.

Protection of Human Subjects
The Iranian nuclear file is a sensitive issue which requires taking safeguards to
avoid potential risk that could happen during the research process or the interviews.
The participants in this study were informed that they had the option of making the
interview confidential, which guarantees not to record the interview, and not to
mention any detailed information about the interview in the bibliography.
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CHAPTER III:

FINDINGS

These findings, which respond to the major research question, have been
reached based on the examination and analysis of the data, There are historical
conflicts between USA and Iran; they led to the hostility between the two countries,
and forced Iran to follow a strategy of nuclear ambiguity regarding its nuclear
activities. The study findings indicate that Iran follows this strategy of nuclear
ambiguity in order to protect its program and its national security against existential
threats mainly from the United States.

American-Iranian Hostility
The hostility between USA and Iran has historical background. The historical
evidence of hostility between the United States and Iran has supported Iran’s
perception that USA represents a significant threat. One prominent example was USA
involvement in the historical coup that toppled the Iranian Prime Minister Muhammad
Mossadeq in 1953. The hostage crisis in Iran started when some Iranian students
stormed USA Embassy in Tehran and around 66 American citizens were detained for
444 days. USA played a pivotal role in supporting Iraq against Iran in the 'eight-year
war'. The American position supports the Israeli rhetoric against Iran and its threats
that will take military action against Iran. Moreover, The United States and its
European allies in the UNSC lead the imposing of resolutions against Iran and the
driving of sanctions on Tehran through the IAEA
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The 1953 coup in Iran
In 1953, Iran suffered a coup that toppled then-Prime Minister Mossadeq. This
coup was supported by the CIA, which was inconsequential to a big extent as the
Iranian military received financial assistance from USA to overthrow the government
of Mosaddeq. This CIA operation is called Ajax. In this period, Iran was suffering
economic crises due to the oil embargo following the nationalization of the AngloIranian oil company. Businessmen and merchants were negatively affected by
Mossadeq's nationalization decision. Political plots began spreading with rumors of
potential military coup as well as frustrations among the armed forces (Takeyh,
2010).
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One of the coup's planners claimed that the CIA was deeply involved in
initiating the coup, and returning the Shah into power. The CIA's document offered
background of the agency's involvement in the 1953 coup. The document declared
that, first, Britain's concerns regarding Mossadeq's decision of nationalizing its oil
company encouraged Britain to press USA to launch the Ajax Operation and remove
Mossadeq. Second, the CIA and SIS chose General FazlollahZahedi, who secretly
obtained $5 million, to replace Mossadeq. Third, a cleric's home was bombed by
Iranians working for the CIA to turn the religious community against Mossadeq
(Risen, 2000).
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This coup represented direct USA interference in Iran’s political

independence and a violation of its sovereignty.
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Iran Hostage Crisis and Carter's Mission
The ‘Hostage Crisis’ in Iran, which started in 1979 to 1981, negatively
affected the nature of diplomatic relation between Iran and USA for decades. In 1979,
around 3000 Iranian students detained 66 USA citizens as hostages in USA Embassy
in Tehran.
The demonstrators claimed that they will not release the hostages until the
Shah comes back to Iran, and prosecuted for his crimes against the Iranians. Although
this siege was expected to take only some days, the hostages were kept for 444 days
until they were released in 1980. The former USA President Carter sought to find a
diplomatic solution to set the hostages free in conjunction with the intention to launch
military action, which led to the death of eight USA soldiers during the rescue
64

mission with failure to set the hostages free (McDermott, 1992).

The hostage crisis was a part of the social, economic and religious revolution
that invaded Iran after the Islamic Revolution. This revolution was due to the
oppressive policy that was practiced by the Iranian regime. The hostage crisis was an
expression from the Iranian revolutionaries of their anger at the United States (Wolf,
2006).
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In 1981, the hostages were released after 444 days. The Iranians successfully achieved
what they aimed for and did not release the hostages until Ronald Reagan became a
president, as they intended to humiliate Jimmy Carter. After this crisis, Iran's concern
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was from potential USA revenge as a response to the hostage crisis. This crisis
increased the hostility between USA and Iran.
American Support of Iraq against Iran
In the eight-year war, USA played primary role to ban Iran from victory over
Iraq. USA influence in the Gulf had been diminished, especially in the beginning of
Iraq-Iran War. At that time, there were no diplomatic relations between the United
States and either Iran or Iraq. The United States lost its position in Iran due to the
Islamic Revolution and, consequently, lost a large portion of oil imports from both
countries. In 1982, with the emergence of signs of the collapse of Iraq and the triumph
of Iran, USA changed its neutral position and gradually started to support Iraq in the
war. In 1984, USA escalated its position when it used the Saudi air defenses to shoot
down two Iranian warplanes (Sterner, 1984, 128).
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USA military action during the Iran-Iraq War was a major reason why Iran
could not defeat Iraq and its military capabilities. The failure of defeating Iraq was
mainly due to USA intervention, which convinced Iran that USA will stand against
the defeat of Iraq. The Iranian leaders could not ignore USA military deployment and
attacking the Iranian oil facilities, which led to the escalation of antiwar opposition
inside Iran.
The UN Resolutions against Iran Driven by USA
The resolutions on Iran driven by the United States have increased the hostility
between the two states. International sanctions on Iran have escalated when the UNSC
issued a resolution in 2006. USA and its major European allies such as the UK,
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France and Germany played a pivotal role in imposing sanctions on Iran. Moreover,
some neighboring countries of Iran joined USA to pose pressure on Iran. This
coalition was due to the increasing worries regarding the Iranian nuclear aspirations
67

(Cordesman , Gold, Khazai & Bosserman, 2013).

In 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) expressed concerns
regarding several Director General's reports that spread fears of Iran's nuclear
program which could have a military dimension due to the undeclared nuclear
activities in Iran. They stated that the gaps in information related to Iran's nuclear
program are still the source of concerns; hence, the IAEA cannot determine whether
there are nuclear materials. Iran has not suspended all enrichment activities, resumed
cooperation with the IAEA within the AP or met the obligations required by the IAEA
Board of Governors (UNSC, 2006).
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In 2008, the UNSC reaffirmed its obligations to

the NPT and its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008).
It also reaffirmed its position towards the Iranian nuclear program calling Iran to the
full compliance to the UNSC resolutions and the IAEA Board of Governors (UNSC,
2008).
.In
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2010, the UNSC reaffirmed that the Iranian nuclear issue can be resolved and

mutual confidence with the IAEA and UNSC can be rebuilt through responding to
their calls. These calls have been going on since 2003 due to the failure of Tehran to
report all its activities and facilities under the IAEA safeguards. Ever since, Iran has
been ignoring the IAEA attempts to urge it to cooperate fully, and work on signing
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and ratifying the Additional Protocol as a measure to build confidence between Iran
and the Agency.
Iran also refused the calls for suspending its uranium enrichment and
70

introduced more nuclear materials to Natanz (UNSC, 2010).

The UNSC noted the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in
supporting the Iranian nuclear activities, and developing the nuclear weapon system.
The UNSC called for the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to exercise vigilance
on the Iranian banking transactions, especially the Central Bank of Iran, to halt bank
transfers that would contribute to spread of sensitive nuclear activities such as the
71

nuclear weapons (UNSC, 2010).

USA Driving Sanctions through IAEA and NPT
The IAEA sanctions over Iran are largely driven by the United States. The
Iranian Member of Parliament Mahmoud Ahmadi Bighash said that the IAEA reports
on Tehran have been supported by the CIA, and have been serving USA and Israeli
interests. Although the IAEA reports must be issued within a legal framework, the
reports are issued in contrary to the agency's obligations and commitments (Siasat
72

Daily, 9 November, 2011).

Iran has expressed its annoyance from USA misguiding the IAEA to issue
reports on Iran regarding its nuclear program. The official speaker of the Iranian
parliament Ali Larijani claimed that the IAEA has implemented the directives of USA
and Israel to issue its reports on Iran. He said that the recent reports on Tehran have
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been issued after a rough week in USA and Israeli policies, which considered an
enmity to Iran (Press TV, 13 November, 2013).
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Larijani stressed that the

cooperation between the IAEA and Iran has to be reconsidered, because such
cooperation is likely to have an impact on the IAEA reports.
In addition, both USA and Israel condemn Tehran of seeking a nuclear weapon as a
pretext in order to persuade the UNSC to pose further round of sanctions on Iran
(Press TV, 13 November, 2013).
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In 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors reaffirmed the role of the Director General in
solving the Iranian nuclear issue stressing that they will continue their diplomatic
efforts to solve this problem. The Board expressed its concerns regarding the Iranian
challenge of the obligations and the resolutions of the IAEA and UNSC. Moreover,
Iran breached the obligations by establishing enrichment facility in Qom without
notifying the IAEA (IAEA, 2009).
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In 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors issued a report entitled
“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of
Security Council Resolutions in Iran” in order to call for the Director General of the
IAEA to continue his offices to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, and implement the
UNSC resolutions. The Board expressed its concerns that Iran is still challenging the
IAEA obligations and the UNSC resolutions stressing that the IAEA will not be able
to present trusted assurances indicating that the nuclear facilities are for peaceful uses
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(IAEA, 2011).

In 2012, the IAEA Board of Governors reaffirmed the importance of

talks between Iran and the IAEA regarding the access to Iran's nuclear sites. The
Board also expressed its concerns about the expansion of the uranium enrichment in
Iran, especially in Fordow plant (IAEA, 2012).
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Threat Assessment
Iran is actually surrounded by threats that make it feel unsafe. The Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has increased the pressures on the United States
to put an end to the Iranian nuclear ambitions and make this file on the top of the
agenda in the Middle East. Netanyahu said that USA President Obama must show the
new President of Iran that the military option is still strongly on the table. He
expressed his concerns that Iran would follow alternative strategies to produce its
nuclear weapon. Officially, USA approved Netanyahu’s calls. However, The United
States showed intentions to stop imposing further sanctions on Iran in exchange for
confidence building between the two parties (Rudoren & Sanger, 2013).
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In conclusion, the findings show that Iran's perception is that its national
security is at risk, especially from USA, resulting from historical disputes between the
two states. These disputes started with the Iranian coup in 1953 and followed by the
Hostage Crisis in Iran from 1979 to 1981.USAA also supported Iraq in its war against
Iran when it was concerned with the growing power of Iran, particularly as it is
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working to develop its nuclear capabilities. Accordingly, USA started to increase
pressures on Iran through driving the UNSC resolutions, as well as the IAEA reports,
against Iran.
In addition, USA increased its rhetoric, and supported Israel in its rhetoric to launch
military action, against Iran. Many European allies to USA also adopt the sanctions
against Iran and have military bases in the Gulf through the NATO. The United States
also increased its military bases in the Gulf area and supported the rhetoric of the Gulf
States against Iran. These elements pose threats to Iran's national security, which led
Iran to follow the policy of nuclear ambiguity regarding its program in order to deter
its adversaries.

USA Rhetoric Supporting Israel against Iran
The USA rhetoric against Iran has become increasingly threatening since
2007; this, in conjunction with Iran’s prior history with USA, heightened Iran’s sense
of threat. Iran has emerged as the most important foreign policy topic in the USA
agenda. The rhetoric escalated when the Democratic candidates were discussing
whether Bush would deter Iran, while the Republican candidates were arguing who
was going to follow a tough policy against Iran, with the possibility of taking military
action if needed (Baker, 2007).
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President Obama said that USA could take military

action against Iran in June. The Israeli TV reported that Obama was going to discuss
in the next meeting the possibility of taking military action against Iran, as he was
planning to visit Israel in March 2013 to work on potential military attack. Israel has
been encouraging USA to take military action against Iran in order to stop Iran's
79
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nuclear plan, which clarifies that USA believes that all options are on the table against
Iran (Russia Today, 26 February 2013).
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Recently, USA Minister of Defense Chuck Hagel supported the Israeli rhetoric
against Iran by saying that USA and Israel face the same threats from Iran. He said
that Israel has the right to make the decision of taking military action against Iran to
protect itself. Both USA and Israel have frequently condemned Iran on its developing
the nuclear program for military purposes (Press TV, 22 April, 2013).
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A continuation to the policy of hostile rhetoric, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli
Prime Minister, attacked the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in his speech directed
to the U.N. General Assembly. Netanyahu described the Iranian President as a "wolf
in sheep's clothing,", announcing that Israel will face Iran alone in order to deprive it
from possessing nuclear weapons. He also assailed the credibility of Rouhani due to
82

his diplomatic initiatives with the U.S (Charbonneau & Williams, 2013, October 1).

The speech contained only strict sanctions and possible military actions. Netanyahu
believes that Iran will be forced to start negotiations regarding the dismantlement of
its program. In contrast, the Iranian President did not mention Israel in his speech.
Mr. Netanyahu also maintained that Israel has the right to attack the Iranian nuclear
facilities, even if Israel forced to take his step alone. He added that there is no
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difference between Rouhani's policy and the former Iranian Presidents as they all
83

serving the same unforgiving doctrine (Sengupta & Gladstone, 2013, October 1).

On one hand, I think that the assertive tone in Mr. Netanyahu's speech is a means to
put Iran under the pressure of exposure for a potential military attack, especially that
the Iranian President Rouhani made diplomatic initiatives to start negotiations with
the U.S. This strategy is to gain as much as benefits through the negotiations with
Iran. On the other hand I think that Netanyahu's hostile speech reflects two main
concerns; first, Iran has become close to the nuclear threshold. Second, the
negotiations between Iran and the U.S would lead to reduce the economic sanctions
and military actions, especially which the U.S is facing obstacles from the Democrats
who have claimed that they will face any efforts to reduce sanctions on Iran.
The bilateral talks between Iran and the U.S. started with a presentation by the Iranian
Minister of foreign affairs Mohamad Javad Zarif, which offered new restrictions on
the Iranian nuclear program in return for reducing the U.S sanctions that have
severely harmed the Iranian economy. Although Iran will provide concessions in
order to abate the imposed sanctions, the Rouhani administration still insists on
continuing the uranium enrichment process, which opposed by the U.S. In addition,
Iran's underground facilities such as Natanz in Qom pose concerns to the U.S and
Israel because the airstrikes couldn't reach these facilities (Dreazen & Hudson,
2013).84
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In addition, Iran may agree to put the uranium enrichment under the international
monitoring, but in border areas in the country. The Iranians also offered that the
plutonium production could be suspended if a temporary deal was reached. Tehran
has expressed its readiness to cooperate with other countries to enrich uranium inside
Iran in order to reassure the international community that it would not be transferred
to military purposes. In exchange, Iran calls for sanctions reduction, and obtains the
right to enrich the uranium. However, the U.S is unwilling to declare the Iranian right
to enrich uranium, fearing it would be a motivation for many countries in future and
affect the global nuclear non-proliferation (Borger & Sherwood, 2013).
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Military Threats facing Iran
There are collective military threats facing Iran. Iran's nuclear position is
viewed as a mechanism and not perceived as an attack. In order for Iran to face its
regional adversaries alone, there will be need for nuclear weapons. As shown in the
Conventional Weapon Chart (Appendix I), Iran has conventional superiority over the
Gulf States. For instance, in comparison with Saudi Arabia, Iran has the powerful and
advanced missile system 'Shahab'. Moreover, Iran has 350.000 troops and around
1,663 military tanks, while Saudi Arabia has 75,000 troops with about 565 tanks.
Bahrain has a very weak navy, with 700 troops, in comparison with Iran (The Military
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Balance, 2012, See Appendix I).
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The Bahraini Air Force also has 1,500 troops with two squadrons only, with
no air defense. Following its collapse in 2003, Iraq no longer has a strongly army in
the region; Iraq's army is weak in comparison with Iran. It will neither help nor pose a
threat to Iran. Iran reaped a lot of gains from USA-Iraq War because the collapse of
Iraq converted it from a bitter enemy to a neutral country. Accordingly, Iran can now
defend itself against any regional adversaries with its conventional weapons (The
87

Military Balance, 2012, See Appendix I).

However, this is not the case in the Gulf where the USA presence is pretty
heavy. Iran does not have conventional or nuclear superiority over the USA. But
having the capacity of a nuclear program would act as a deterrent and make the cost
of attacking a nuclear capable state much higher than attacking a non-nuclear capable
state. In a sense, Iran is following a modified version of North Korea's strategy
(Fahmy, personal interview. 28 Mar, 2013).
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According to those interviewed in this study, if Iran attempts to produce
nuclear weapons, it will face military action by both Israel and the USA. The UK and
France might also join, depending on the circumstances. The attack would be by
conventional weapons. No nuclear weapon will be used by either Israel or USA.
The GCC States would join in if they are directly attacked; in which case, they too
would unleash their considerable air power against Iran (Anonymous source, personal
89

interview, 5 April, 2013).

All military threats to Iran are featured excluding the

nuclear threats because the nuclear attack on Iran not only will harm Iran, but also

87

Ibid.
Fahmy, N. (2013, March 28). Interview by Tamer. S Mahboub . “Understanding the Iranian
motivations for possessing nuclear capabilities”.
89
Anonymous. (2013, April 05). Interview by Tamer. S Mahboub. Understanding the iranian
motivations for possessing nuclear capabilities.
88

44

will destroy the whole region and will lead to serious consequences (Zahran, personal
interview, 8 April, 2013).90 If there is an attack on Iran by USA or Israel, Iran may
91

withdraw from the NPT (Abushady, personal interview, 1 April, 2013).

There are no potential threats from the Gulf States because they cannot
prevent the Iranian ambitions, neither diplomatically nor militarily. However, Iran
faces threats from USA and Israel because the Iranian nuclear aspirations pose a
92

threat to their interests in the region (Abushady, personal interview, 1 April, 2013).

The following factors helped to free the American hostages in the Gulf: The
improvement of the Israeli-Turkish relations, the withdrawal of USA troops from Iraq
and Afghanistan, and the dependence on the oil pipeline as an alternative to the
passage from the Strait of Hormuz. These factors are also possible steps to launch a
war against Iran (Anonymous source, personal interview, 18 April, 2013).
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Further support for launching a military action against Iran
In addition to the presence of USA forces in the area, two more sources of
threats to Iran's national security are evident. These are NATO which is led by USA,
and the USA support for the Gulf States against Iran.
Possible NATO Support:
There are other parties supporting the military action against Iran besides USA
and Israel; NATO is one of these. In 2007, the former USA President Bush called on
NATO to increase its troops in Afghanistan. He announced the deployment of about
90
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50,000 troops from USA and NATO in the Gulf and other countries such as
Lithuania, Norway and Check Republic (CNN, 15 February, 2007).
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The increase of

USA and NATO troops in the Gulf poses further pressures on Iran. Deploying more
military troops makes Iran insists more on its nuclear ambiguity policy as a means to
deter these states. USA and NATO military forces are deployed in the Gulf as the
United States has embarked on a war against Iran. Both USA and NATO are arming
Israel with missile capabilities as a part of planned military action against Iran
(Schoenman, 2012).
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In 2012, the Italian Minister of Defense Visited Israel to meet Netanyahu and
he said that Italy will spend one billion dollars for the Israeli defense industry. This
deal was part of NATO's complete support for arming Israel with missile capabilities.
The former head of Mossad claimed that this deal is to militarily support Israel against
Iran, especially with the Mossad's role of assassinating the Iranian nuclear scientists.
He added that the collective deals between USA, Israel, the neighboring countries of
Iran and NATO are a means to launch a military assault against Iran (Schoenman,
2012).
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The cooperation between the United States and NATO gives the impression that there
is a preparation for military action against Iran. Obama gave an order to different
USA forces in order to make concentrated existence in two islands namely Socotra,
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located in the Indian Ocean, and the Omani Island, which located in the south of Strait
97

of Hormuz (Global Research, 31 January, 2012).

The U.S Support for the Gulf States against Iran:
USA influence over the Gulf States tightens noose on Iran, and makes it lives
actually in a hostile environment. The United States made efforts to create an antiIranian coalition which consists of the Gulf States. During the rule of the former
American President George Bush, USA attempted to persuade the countries members
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) plus Egypt and Jordan to join this coalition.
However, these states did not agree to join such a coalition to avoid being a
party to the conflict between Iran and the United States. President Obama tried to
revive the idea of making coalition against Iran, but it failed again because the Arab
States preferred to maintain good ties with both USA and Iran, as they have limited
98

military capabilities in comparison with the conflicting parties (Ottaway, 2009).

The Improvements in the Iranian missile program forced the Gulf States to
promote their missile capabilities to deter the Iranian system. The Gulf States have
their concerns regarding the Iranian capabilities and seek to avoid exposure to attack.
USA supports the defense in the Persian Gulf and many Gulf states such as Bahrain,
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and
Kuwait have purchased missile defense systems from the United States. These
systems include Patriot capabilities, Pac-3 as well as long and medium range missiles.
The United States also planned to create a regional system to link the entire region
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with an intelligence network provided with defense systems that serve USA forces
(M. Cronin, 2012).
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Does Iran See Nuclear Weapons as a Deterrent?
Iran believes that the nuclear weapon will effectively deter its adversaries. Iran
does not face serious threats from the Gulf States, and has sufficient conventional
capabilities to face conventional threats from its regional adversaries. However, the
tension Iranians are facing is part of a larger issue in international politics. Iran fears a
situation where America or Israel is successful in provoking an American attack. In
such situation, if Iran wants to fight America with conventional capability, it will not
win. Iran is trying to show people that the cost of attacking Iran is equivalent of
lighting a fire in an oil well; so this cost would be too high because Iran has the
capacity to retaliate and deter it adversaries (Fahmy, personal interview. 28 Mar.
2013).
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Threats remain rhetoric and there is nothing physical because the timing of
attack must be taken into consideration as the reaction to actual military assault. All
parties know that if there is a military action, it will lead to regional disaster.
101

(Anonymous source, personal interview, 12 May, 2013).

Given the Israeli nuclear weapon superiority and the powerful missile system,
Iran will not be able to face Israel. Accordingly, Iran depends on rational behavior,
and avoids the risk as a means of deterrence (Bar, 2011, p: 5&6).102
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Iran's Nuclear Ambiguity
Nuclear ambiguity is the path of Iran to maintain its security. The feeling that
it lives in a hostile environment has encouraged Iran to follow nuclear ambiguity as a
strategy to work under the umbrella of the NPT, and avoid the announcement of its
nuclear activities. This policy provides Iran with the ambiguity of its progress in its
nuclear program until it gets its target which is the nuclear weapon. The nuclear
ambiguity also enables Iran to impose its influence in the region. For instance, Iran
has threatened that it would close the Strait of Hormuz, and prevent the passage of
two-thirds of the world's exported oil until the international sanctions over its oil
103

exports are stopped (Fox News, 17 January 2012).

This policy also makes the states think that Iran already has a nuclear weapon
due to the suspicious behavior of Iran. For example, President Obama said that there
104

is a one year distance between Iran and the bomb (Carter, 2013).

Moreover, this

strategy shields Iran from being in violation of its obligations under the NPT. The
military surveillance forced Iran to follow this policy to avoid exposure to any
potential military action. Iran also claims that its nuclear program is for peaceful
purposes as a strategy to gain the support of the other members of the Non-Aligned
Movement (Anonymous source, personal interview, 18 April, 2013).
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Iran thinks that this policy safeguards it from more pressures because it is
already committed to the NPT and has obligations to make public announcements, so
they work under the umbrella of the NPT. “This policy provides the Iranians with the
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ambiguity regarding how much progress they have actually achieved; they say they
have covered one-third, 45 % or 70 % of the way. They will keep giving contradicting
information until they get what they want when they want; they have to be ambiguous
about how much progress they have made.” (Fahmy, personal interview. 28 Mar.
2013).
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The Iranian leaders are surely aware that any overt action to actually produce
nuclear weapons would spark a pre-emptive military attack by not only Israel, but also
the United States. President Obama has repeatedly said that he is not bluffing when he
insists that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. USA would use the air power and
missiles to destroy much of what the Iranian leadership values (Anonymous source,
personal interview, 5 April, 2013).
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Iran follows this nuclear ambiguity policy because it faces threats and has
adversaries, so Iran does not declare its activities in an attempt to protect its national
108

security (Zahran, personal interview, 8 April, 2013).

The USA presence in the Gulf, which poses threats to Iran, forced Iran to follow this
strategy of nuclear ambiguity. Moreover, Israel is aware that the Iranian ambition to
possess a nuclear weapon will pose a threat to the USA influence in the region and,
consequently, to Israel's security; hence, Israel will try hard to prevent any threat to its
109

national security. (Anonymous source, personal interview, 18 April, 2013).

Hence,

Iran thinks that the only way to develop its nuclear program without exposure to
threats is to follow the policy of nuclear ambiguity (Anonymous source, personal
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interview, 18 April, 2013).

Iran follows this policy because its national security is

threatened by the United States which pushes hard to increase pressures on Iran.
Meanwhile, Iran wants to achieve the balance of power in the region as a means for
achieving its missing security (Anonymous source, personal interview, 12 May,
2013).
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Alternative Arguments
The Iranian nuclear program, particularly the military part, started during the
Shah of Iran. Iran was aiming at increasing its status in the eyes of the West, in
comparison with Turkey, in the competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union during the Cold War.
The Iranian motivation was built on its role in the region. The program was
stopped after the Shah and now, according to the Iranians, they seek an active nuclear
program for peaceful purposes. However, this explanation leaves behind a lot of
questions about whether they are pursuing a military program to acquire nuclear
112

weapons (Fahmy, personal interview. 28 Mar. 2013).

It is unknown whether the Shah’s intentions were innocent or not. The Shah
relied, in its peaceful program, on the United States, France, Germany, and imported
uranium from South Africa. After the Islamic Revolution, 90% of the Bushehr nuclear
reactor was completed. According to Iran, it continued to develop its nuclear program
for peaceful uses seeking for nuclear energy. After the abolishing of the nuclear
agreements between Iran and the other states following the Revolution, Iran started to
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illegally obtain the uranium from Pakistan. (Abushady, personal interview, 1 April,
2013).113
The Iranian nuclear program started when the Shah had a desire to make Iran a
powerful state in the region, as an attempt to recreate the glory of the Persian Empire.
Recreating the Persian Empire does not mean that Iran has an expansionist agenda,
but it is just a desire to be the super power in the region as it used to be in the past
ages. After the Revolution, Khomeni cancelled the nuclear program, and then
retrieved it once again due to the USA support for Iraq against Iran. Accordingly, Iran
started to think once more of developing its program to achieve self-reliance,
especially after the declaration of Saddam Hussein about its intentions to start an Iraqi
nuclear and missile program (Anonymous source, personal interview, 18 April,
2013).
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CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis was developed for the purpose of understanding the possible
Iranian motivations for possessing nuclear capabilities. In the 1950s, Iran started to
develop its nuclear program for peaceful purposes. However, in the 1970s, the United
States started to express its concerns that Iran might seek a nuclear weapon. These
concerns were because USA influence would be diminished in the region. After the
cancellation of all nuclear agreements between USA and Iran, Iran insists on
continuing its nuclear ambiguity policy through conducting secret nuclear agreements
with other countries, such as North Korea, China, Pakistan and Russia, leaving behind
a lot of questions regarding the Iranian nuclear intentions.
The debate on Iran’s motivations for pursuing a nuclear weapon resulted in two
different views: One of them is based on the belief that Iran wants to possess a nuclear
weapon as a means of supporting the goals of the 1979 Revolution in the region; the
other view is based on the idea that Iran seeks a nuclear weapon, as a deterrent
weapon, because it lives in a hostile environment in the region, and faces existential
threats from its adversaries, which endangers its national security. Accordingly, Iran
has motivations to achieve its strategy that cannot be achieved depending on the
conventional weapons.
The literature review of this study presented Iran's nuclear motivations by explaining
three main elements namely the motivation of states that seek nuclear weapons, the
nuclear deterrence theory and why states may be prevented from possessing nuclear
weapons. Depending on these elements, the study has explained why Iran insists on
pursuing its nuclear activities despite its status as an NPT signatory state.
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Moreover, the data collected through interviews, secondary research and an analysis
of the military balance confirmed three major things: namely Iran is seeking a nuclear
weapon to deter potential attacks from USA and/or Israel, if Iran has an expansionist
agenda it does not require nuclear weapons, and Iran is not conventionally as
powerful as its adversaries, which therefore forces Iran to follow the policy of nuclear
hedging.
Iran follows a strategy of nuclear ambiguity regarding its activities due to its feeling
that it lives in a hostile environment. This strategy enables Iran to work under the
umbrella of the NPT, and avoid the announcement of its nuclear activities. This policy
of ambiguity imposes secrecy on the progress in its nuclear program until it gets the
nuclear threshold. The nuclear ambiguity also imposes the Iranian power in the region
through deterring the states that pose threats to it, especially the American military
presence in the region.
Therefore, the answer to the major research question of the study is that there
is no irrefutable evidence that Iran's nuclear program has a military dimension. Iran
claims that it uses its right to develop a nuclear program for peaceful purposes under
the Article IV of the NPT, and depends on the strategy of nuclear ambiguity regarding
its activities in order to deter the potential existential threats to its national security,
especially because most of these states, except for USA and its ally Israel, have only
conventional weapons.
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Recommendations
These suggestions could help in solving the problem of nuclear proliferation in
general and the Iranian nuclear problem in particular.


The Middle East region suffers from conflicts regarding the nuclear proliferation
as the Iranian nuclear file poses the main concern for the International
community. In order to contain this problem, the IAEA could adopt an additional
protocol that combines the Middle East States including Israel, which is
considered the main source of threat for Iran; that would encourage Iran to
abandon its nuclear program. This protocol calls for Iran to place all its nuclear
facilities under IAEA safeguards, while calls for Israel to sign and ratify the
NPT. This additional protocol requires putting all nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards. In case of agreement of both states on these terms, this protocol must
be with the guarantee of the Security Council.



The military option should not be considered because it will create more
problems than it would solve. The possibility of Iran's possession of a nuclear
weapon must be taken into account. In case of launching a war against Iran, the
entire region would be destroyed. I think the diplomatic solutions should be the
only way to solve this controversial issue, provided that they are not politicized
and are in favor of international security, not the interests of certain countries.



Economic pressures on Iran will not dissuade Iran from its position as long as it
feels that it is unsafe. Iran believes that these pressures are not because it is an
NPT state. Iran feels that the reason behind these pressures is rather that the
Americans feel that if Iran becomes a powerful state, it will affect USA influence
in the region. Iran feels that there is a policy of double standards in which Israel
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has nuclear weapons and does not face all these considerable pressures because it
is just an American ally. I think that making the Middle East a nuclear free zone
is the best solution for all parties.


The NPT is unequal treaty because it puts the nuclear weapon in the hands of the
superpower states alone; this policy encourage other states, such as Iran, to seek
nuclear weapons, especially if they feel threatened or do not have nuclear states
as an ally. This Policy also forced states such as India, Israel and Pakistan not to
join the NPT. The nuclear arms race is a phenomenon which began to emerge
after the NPT entered into force, although it is assumed that the treaty was
established to limit the nuclear proliferation. What I want to say is that the NPT
has to be reconsidered and all states, without exception, must dismantle their
nuclear weapons and place all their capabilities under the safeguards of the
IAEA.



Establishing a regional organization to manage the Iranian nuclear file could
dissuade Iran from its position as the Middle East states are concerned regarding
this file. This organization would pose pressure on the United States and make it
reconsider its policy regarding the deployment of its forces in the Gulf and,
consequently, diminish the pressure on Iran, which would open a new hope for
resolving this controversial issue.
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Appendix (1): Conventional Weapons Chart
This table shows the comparison between the conventional weapons of the
Middle Eastern States and Pakistan
Rank

State

Army

Navy

1

Pakistan

Submarine force
MSL: anti-ship
missiles
(Harpoon type).

Fighter:(47F16s) & JF-17

2

Israel

Nine Army
Corps
MBT:1,500
tanks (Chinese
Type: 59, 69,
85) (Ukrainian
Type 80UDs)
(T54s, 55s &
M48A5s)
Troops:133.00
0
MBT: 480
mostly
Mercava
Missiles: 3
squadron with
Jericho 1, 2 /
IRBM with
Jericho 2 /
SRBM with
Jericho 1.
SF: 3 battalions

Troops:9.500
Patrol and
coastal
combatants:

Troops:34.000
Fighter & F
Ground
attack: 14
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Squadron (F15A
,B,D / F15B,C,D
/ F15I / F16A,B,C,D
Falcon / F16I
Sufa)
Anti-

Troops:350.0

Troops:18.000

00 (IRGC)
MBT: 1,663
(Zulfiqar,
T72Z, M60A1)

Patrol and
coastal

3

Iran

Artillery:
8,798 variant
types
SF: 5

battalions
Missiles:
Sagger /
Saeqhe 1,2 /
Toophan1,2 /
SSM Shahin
1,2
IRGC Ground

Forces:
100,000 (incl
command, air

Air Force

Submarines:
around 16
variant types

Submarine: 1
sqn
Transport
&Training: 7
sqn
Troops:18.000
Fighter: 5 Sqn
with F-7M, F-14

combatants: 68 Tomact, MiG& 50 craft
Mine

29 A.
Fighter,

countermeasur Ground
es:
Attack: 10 sqn
5
IRGC Naval
Forces
&Marines:

25,000

with F-1E, F-5E,
F Tiger 2& Su24MK& F-4D,
Phantom 2& F5E, F Tiger 2
IRGC Air Force
(Controls Iran's
missiles arsenal):

Air Defense

WMD

State's
Position

Unclear

90 to 110
nuclear
warheads

Ally

Troops:3.000
Battery: 27

200
Nuclear
Warheads

Adversary

with Arrow
1&2 / Iron
Dome / MIM
23 I Hawk &
104 Patriot)

Troops:

Unclear

12,000
Established
mainly to assist
the Iranian
Army, Air
Force and
IRGC air
defense.

MRBM:
Shahab 1,2,3/
Ghadr 1/ Sajjil 2.
SRBM: Fateh/
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manoeure)

4

5

Saudi
Arabia

Syria

Troops:13.500 Troops:20.000
Troops:
Fighter: 5
16,000
Principal
MBT: 565
squadron with
Naval: 500
Surface
M1A2,
Combatants: 4 F15s & F15C,
AD Radar:
M60A3,
D Eagle
Frigates, 3
80 variant
AMX30.
Fighter,
Destroyers.
types
Reconnaissan
Patrol and
Ground
ce: AML60 &
Attack: 7
coastal
AML90
sqnwith F15S
combatants:
APC: 3,600
Eagle / IDS,
30 variant
Artillery: 855
GR1A Tornado
types
National
/ Typhoon
Naval
Guard:
Aviation:
Transport
&
75,000
34Variant types Training: 10
Industrial
sqn variant
Marines:
Security
types
3,000
Force: 9,000
Troops:220.0
Troops:5.000 Troops:100.000 Troops:60.000
00
Fighter: 6
Missiles:
Patrol and
MBT: 4,950
squadron
4,707 SAM
coastal
(Mig23, Mig25,
variant types
(T72, T72M,
combatants:
0

Artillery:

Iraq

Adversary

Troops:75.00

T62K, T62M,
T55, T55MV)

6

Shahab 1,2/
Zelzal

32
(incl Corvettes
and )

3.440
Reconnaissanc
e: 590
SF: 1
Missiles: 850
SSM: Scud B,
Scud C, Frog 7,

Mine warfare:

Troops:193.4

Troops:3.600
Patrol and
coastal
combatants: 6

00

MBT: 336
(incl M1A1 &
Abrams)
3 Armored
brigade
13 Brigade
with light
weapons
Aviation: 7
Squadron with

7 variant types

Naval
Aviation: 13
(Ka28, Mi14)

(2 River Hawk
& 4 Fateh)

Patrol Boats:
17

Patrol Boat
River: 6
(2/200& 4/2010)

Ally

Mig29A)
Fighter,

Ground
Attack: 13 sqn
(Mig21MF,
Mig23BN, Su22,
Su24)

Transport &
Training: 6
sqnvariant types
Aircraft: 365
combat
Helicopters:14
3 variant types
Missiles: ASM,
AAM
Troops:5.050
ISR: 3 squadron
with CH-2000
Sama, Cessna,
Combat Caravan
and Beech 350
King Air)

Neutral

Unclear

Transport &
Training: 4
squadron
3 combat aircraft
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7

Bahrain

Bell 205, 206,
T407, Mi17SA342M
Gazelle
Troops:6.000
MBT: 180
M60 A3
SF: 1 battalion
Artillery:151

Reconnaissan
ce: 46 (22
AML, 8s25
Shorland, 8
Ferri, 8
Saladin)

Troops:700
Patrol and
coastal
combatants:
12 variant types

Principal
Surface
Combatants: 1
Naval
Aviation: 2
Helicopters, light
Bo-105

Troops:1.500
Fighter: 2

Adversary

Unclear

squadron with
F16
Fighter,

Ground
Attack: 1sqn
with F5E, F
Tiger 2

Transport &
Training: two
sqn with Hawk
MK-129 & T67M Firefly
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Appendix (2): Questionnaire
1. What, in your opinion, could be motivating Iran to continue developing its
nuclear program despite all international pressures?
2. During the Shah, Iran signed nuclear agreements with USA to receive nuclear
technology. Why these agreements have been cancelled after the change of the
regime?
3. Do you think that Iran is motivated by desire to achieve a balance of power,
and protect its national security from any potential threats?
4. Do you think that the nuclear ambiguity is a defensive mechanism that could be
protecting any state such as Israel from any existential threats?
5. What possible military threats does Iran face? Are their threats from states with
only conventional capabilities as well as from Israel?
6. Does Iran have sufficient conventional capabilities to face any potential threats
from its adversaries?
7. What is the perception does Iran have towards the sanctions despite the
peaceful nature of the program?
8. Do you think that the Iranian society support the Iranian nuclear policy despite
the economic sanctions imposed on Iran?
9. Do you think that there is a specific strategy motivates Iran to continue working
on its nuclear activities despite the IAEA reports and the UNSC resolutions?
10. Is there any relation between the Iranian support to the Shiite protesters in
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and the Iranian nuclear program?
11. What are the possibilities of convincing Iran to freeze its nuclear activities in
exchange for certain advantages?
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List of Interviewees
1. Anonymous source, this participant is a permanent director of an international
institution specializes in the nuclear deterrence and arms control; he also
served in the USA Department of State for 26 years, 5 April, 2013.
2. Anonymous source, this participant is a former Director of the Department of
Technical Cooperation in the IAEA. He specializes in the nuclear engineering
and he is a current member of the Standing Group of the Nuclear Energy in
the, 18 April, 2013.
3. Ambassador Fahmy is the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
former Dean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the
American University in Cairo. He served as Ambassador of Egypt to the
United States from 1999-2008. He specializes in international security and
nuclear disarmament, 28 Mar. 2013.
4. Ambassador Zahran is a former Egyptian diplomat and was the permanent
representative of Egypt to the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and
disarmament, 8 April, 2013.
5. Professor Abu-Shadi is a scientist in the nuclear energy, and he is a former
Chief inspector of the IAEA and he was responsible for both the North Korean
and the Iranian files, 1 April, 2013.
6. Anonymous source, this participant is a former Permanent Representative of
Egypt to NATO. A Former Member of the Advisory Board of the Secretary
General of the United Nations for Disarmament Affairs. He is also a member
in the International Commission founded by the IAEA on Nuclear Fuel Cycle,
12May, 2013.
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